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"Do not rejoice that you killed (al-Zarqawi), he has left behind 
lions that ... trained under him.” 
Statement attributed to al-Zarqawi’s reported successor Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.1 
 
 
TERRORISM PROCESSES VERSUS TERRORIST ENTITIES 
The air attack that killed al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – the successful 
synchronization of actionable intelligence and tactical military operations that 
eliminated a key terrorist network node – was a good thing. Much of the media- 
pundit and popular analysis that followed has focused on the potential impact of 
al-Zarqawi’s death on the outcome of the war in Iraq. The demand of the 
American public for information and results notwithstanding, the emphasis on 
outcome is not the right approach. Al-Zarqawi’s death serves greater strategic 
purpose both in the war in Iraq, and in the larger war on terror, when viewed as 
process rather than as outcome or end-state. 
The diffusion of threat specificity when viewing terrorism as a methodology, 
exemplified by the terror network known as al Qaeda, makes strategic thought 
difficult. Conventional wartime strategy has traditionally concerned itself with 
identifying enemy weaknesses or centers of gravity and using military force to 
strike at them. The issue becomes how to craft a strategy to exploit an 
asymmetrical enemy’s weaknesses without always knowing who the enemy is, or 
even what means of war he will employ. A war that encompasses literally any 
group using terrorist tactics becomes impossibly broad, engulfing a wide range of 
groups that includes those posing no meaningful threat to the United States.   
In the war on terror it becomes necessary therefore to distinguish between 
terrorism as a process and terrorist networks as entities. Terrorism, as a process, 
includes sub-processes that can be disrupted through the networking of political 
information security (i.e. military or law enforcement), economic, and social 
means. Those sub-processes vulnerable to disruption include:  leadership 
development; alliance building; public and ideological outreach; acquisition of 
funding, materiel, shelter and support; recruitment; organization of efforts; 
indoctrination and training of personnel; planning and targeting; movement and 
operations; communications; and exploitation of results.2 When viewed as 
entities, different targeted strategies are required to defeat individual terrorist 
networks depending on whether their ideologies are rooted in political, economic, 
cultural, or special-interest origins. Strategies focused against specific terrorist 
networks can be resource-intensive and there is no guarantee of success.  It is not 
likely that terrorism can be eliminated by targeting terrorist networks, but by 
disrupting their processes terrorist networks can be contained or rolled back. 
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While it constitutes a tactical success and a great moral victory for the United 
States, it is likely that the death of al-Zarqawi will have little effect on either al 
Qaeda or the ongoing insurgency in Iraq. With a structure that has been 
described as “horizontal as opposed to hierarchical, and ad hoc as opposed to 
unified” the Iraqi insurgency has achieved the resiliency of a network.3 Removal 
of key nodes in the network leaves the remaining key nodes and links, and the 
white space between them intact and functioning. According to Bruce Hoffman of 
the RAND Corporation, "There is no center of gravity, no leadership, no hierarchy 
[to the Iraqi insurgency]; they are more a constellation than an organization.  
They have adopted a structure that assures their longevity."4   
If al-Zarqawi’s death leaves the Iraqi insurgency and al Qaeda intact and 
capable of continuing to fight, the questions for the United States become: Does 
his death advance United States policy in the war in Iraq, and the overall war on 
terror? How successful is the United States in disrupting the processes of the 
Iraqi Insurgency and of al Qaeda? As a corollary, what are the domestic 
implications? The answer perhaps can be found in the tools of policy that are 
available to the United States although its track record in using them has not 
always been good.     
 
UNITED STATES POLICY AND ITS TOOLS IN IRAQ 
In On War, in his discussion of war as an instrument of policy and the 
relationship between political and military interests, Carl von Clausewitz speaks 
of the “assumption that policy knows the instrument it means to use.”5 United 
States policy for Iraq, as established by the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 
is a nation that is “peaceful, united, stable, democratic and secure [italics 
added].”6 The tools by which the United States means to achieve its policy, as laid 
out in the Strategy, are political, security (i.e. military) and economic. Noticeably 
missing from the Strategy are effective applications of the information tool, 
which includes strategic communications, and the social tool, which includes 
culture and religion.  
If we accept Clausewitz’s supposition as true, then it is not self-evident that 
United States policy knows the instrument it means to use in Iraq, despite the 
occasional military success in removing terrorist nodes such as al-Zarqawi. It 
appears the United States has elected to use military means as its primary tool to 
establish the necessary political, security and economic pre-conditions and 
processes for democracy in Iraq. It does not seem to focus at all on the social pre-
conditions for democracy.  This is a problematic approach. 
Much of United States’ effort in Iraq from 2003-2005 has relied heavily on 
military occupation and counter-insurgency efforts to establish democratic 
processes. Thus far, they have produced very mixed results and it is not certain  
the means being used – military – are the correct means at all. Anthony 
Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has touched 
upon this issue. In Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Working Notes, he writes, “Democracy is the last, not the first, priority [when 
fighting an insurgency]. Security, effective governance and services, rule of law 
and limits to corruption, education, health, and employment all have a much 
higher priority.” 7 It is here, in the processes for achieving the priorities laid out 
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by Cordesman, that the death of al-Zarqawi has the potential to serve its greatest 
purpose. 
The proof of this assertion is in the lack of progressive results thus far. From 
2004-2005 the nature of the insurgency in Iraq – an insurgency the Bush 
Administration was reluctant to recognize – changed. During this period the 
number of American troop deaths in Iraq declined by six percent and the number 
of American troops wounded declined by thirty-three percent. This is not, 
however, an indicator of progress in achieving the stated goal of a democratic 
Iraq. As reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at the 
same time American casualties were declining the Iraqi populace experienced a 
different and much starker reality: an increase in insurgent attacks and in 
casualties, as shown in the table below.  
 
 

































































Notes:       1.   The average success rate (attacks that cause damage or casualties) = 24% 
2.   Insurgent attacks focused more on Iraqis and less on U.S. forces in 2005. 
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Reliable figures are difficult to obtain but the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies indicates that, by one media estimate, for every United 
States soldier killed in Iraq at least thirteen Iraqi civilians are killed. Its 
conclusion is that the trends indicate “cycles in an evolving struggle, but not signs 
that the struggle is being lost or won…There have, as yet, been [no] decisive 
trends or no tipping points: simply surges and declines.”8 The increase in Iraqi 
casualties reflects a shift in the focus of the al-Zarqawi-led insurgency away from 
attacking United States and Coalition forces and toward igniting a sectarian civil 
war between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. These conditions hardly seem conducive 
to convincing the Iraqi people that democracy is working for them.  
 
The United States’ Track Record in Fostering Democracy 
If the military and security conditions for achieving democracy in Iraq remain 
uncertain, the political, economic, and social conditions are even more so. In a 
2003 article entitled “Democracy? In Iraq?,” Chappell Lawson and Strom 
Thacker of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford 
University, concluded that while United States efforts are not completely 
hopeless, “Iraq is unlikely to sustain democratic institutions, even given 
protracted U.S. occupation.” They base their conclusion on empirical studies that 
indicate “Iraq has few of the success factors associated with democracy, such as a 
high degree of economic development and a Western cultural tradition.”9 
Lawson and Thacker measured levels of democracy on a numerical scale 
during 1996-2000. Not surprisingly, Iraq under Saddam Hussein scored lowest 
on the scale along with other countries such as Afghanistan (under the Taliban), 
Burma, Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 
and Vietnam. From their data they concluded that richer, more literate, more 
egalitarian, and more homogenous societies do better at establishing and 
sustaining democracy. Petro-states, countries with high Muslim populations, and 
societies with little cultural affinity for the West tend to be less democratic. 
Lawson and Thacker conclude that Iraq would likely not become a free society on 
its own. 
Lawson and Thacker also looked at the impact of American occupation on the 
likelihood of a country establishing and sustaining democracy.  In the last century 
the United States has occupied nineteen countries with the goal of reshaping 
their political systems. They found that in about half the cases democratic 
institutions lasted, but in the other half they did not. At best, American 
occupation seems to be only a modest and indirect influence on the future long-
term development of other countries. Those countries that became democratic 
following American occupation already had the necessary social, economic, and 
political pre-conditions that made them more likely to do so, and those that did 
not have those indicators were unlikely to make the transition. 
 
Domestic Implications 
As the terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated, no longer can the United States rely 
on the conventional protections of time and distance as a result of being 
surrounded by vast oceans and air space. Instead, unconventional attacks may 
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come with little or no warning, and they may occur against United States citizens 
and interests at home as well as abroad. In the war on terror future attacks on the 
United States may originate from within as well as from outside the nation’s 
borders. The question of whether policy knows its tools is equally applicable on 
the domestic front. 
United States policy for domestic counterterrorism is established by the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, which calls for preventing terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, 
and minimizing the damage from attacks that do occur.10 Unlike the war in Iraq 
where the primary United States policy tool is military, the primary policy tool for 
domestic counterterrorism is law enforcement. The National Vision for domestic 
counterterrorism established by the National Strategy for Homeland Security is 
to “redefine our law enforcement mission to focus on the prevention of all 
terrorist acts within the United States, whether international or domestic in 
origin.”11 Effective application of the information tool is prescribed within the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, but it does not mention the use of the 
political, economic, or social tools for domestic counterterrorism.  
Similar to the insurgency in Iraq the greatest domestic terrorist threat comes 
from resilient terror networks, whether transnational or domestic. Realizing that 
not all potential threats can be prevented, a network-centric response that 
incorporates all the tools of policy – political, information, security (military or 
law enforcement), economic and social – is required.  Network-centric operations 
refers to the linking of people and systems into a common shared awareness 
network at all levels – international, federal, state, local, tribal, private – to 
obtain information superiority and enhanced decision-making and response. The 
working theory of network-centric operations is that organizations and agencies 
that are networked will outperform organizations and agencies that are not 
networked. Within such a concept, the transit of threats from their source to their 
targets at the local level presents a series of processes that can be disrupted in 
order to defeat, deter, preempt, prevent, protect and respond to them.  
The concept of network-centric operations, however, is not simply about 
technology, per se; it is also about behavior. The idea is to feed information as 
quickly as possible to leaders and operators so they can make better-informed 
decisions about what, when and how to respond to threats. In contrast to 
traditional operations that are agency-specific, network-centric operations 
focus on passing information and intelligence among different agencies and 
entities to increase their ability as a whole to respond to threats.   
 
THE WAY AHEAD 
If United States policy is to be successful in the war on terror, if democratic 
processes are to have a chance to take root in Iraq and if terrorist attacks within 
the United States are to be prevented, it will be necessary for United States policy 
makers to adhere to Clausewitz’s assumption that “policy knows the instrument it 
means to use.” In doing so, they must use all the tools available – diplomatic, 
information, military/law enforcement, economic and social – to disrupt the 
processes of terrorism while simultaneously fostering the processes by which 
democracy can flourish. Of these tools, the security – military and law 
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enforcement – option offers the lowest probability of long-term success, 
particularly if wielded in isolation from the other tools. Unless the processes that 
breed them are addressed there will always be another al-Zarqawi to confront. 
Unfortunately, there are signs that the administration does not understand 
Clausewitz’s assumption, as it is scaling back funding for the main organizations 
trying to build democratic institutions in Iraq such as political parties and civil 
society groups. According to the Washington Post, agencies such as the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican 
Institute will see their grants from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development dry up in 2006, leaving them only special funds earmarked by 
Congress last year. Similarly, the U.S. Institute of Peace has had its funding for 
Iraq democracy promotion cut by sixty percent, and the National Endowment for 
Democracy expects to run out of money for Iraqi programs by September 2006.12  
Writing in the New York Times, Retired Marine Corps Colonel Thomas X. 
Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century, 
outlines what he calls a laundry list of United States inaction in Iraq.13 Among the 
actions that Hammes says greatly increase the likelihood of civil war are  
diversion of nearly half the money allocated to reconstruction in Iraq to other 
needs, including security; cuts in financing for democratization efforts, many of 
them undertaken by nongovernmental groups; proposals for cutting overall Army 
and Marine forces for fighting the “long war” in Iraq; inauguration of only four of 
the proposed sixteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and continuous 
undermanning of Army staffs and units in Iraq, even those training Iraqi security 
forces. The result, according to Hammes, is,  
 
The [Iraqi] militias are already looking ahead: some are carving out safe 
areas they will use as bases in the coming [civil] war by driving Iraqis of 
other ethnic and religious groups out of mixed neighborhoods and 
villages. Iraqi government officials estimated that more than 100,000 
families have already fled their homes. This falling back on militias and 
preparing for internecine conflict is not a new phenomenon. It is exactly 
what we saw in Afghanistan nearly two decades ago. Once the Afghans 
believed the Soviet troops were finally pulling out, the various insurgent 
groups stopped fighting the invaders and began positioning for a 
multisided civil war. That conflict, of course, lasted until the United States 
invaded Afghanistan in 2001.14   
 
On the domestic front, the United States faces the risk of complacency in the war 
on terror and much more needs to be done to build networks for confronting the 
terrorist threat. Nearly five years after the attacks of 9/11 and the pronouncement 
of a Global War on Terror, metrics for performance related to clear and 
obtainable national objectives are largely lacking. Measurements are inextricably 
linked to strategies. While the goals of terrorist groups may be diametrically 
opposed to those of the United States, however, they may also be tangential in 
nature with each side achieving objectives and making progress according to 
their different measurement systems.   
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It remains an open question as to why al Qaeda has not followed its attacks of 
9/11 with additional attacks on the United States. The absence of attacks could be 
taken as an indicator of successful Homeland Security countermeasures 
implemented by the United States. Another alternative could be that the 9/11 
attacks allowed al Qaeda to accomplish its strategic objectives and it sees no need 
for further attacks on the United States at this time. Uncertainty with respect to 
wartime strategies and measurements makes it difficult to determine or to 
demonstrate progress.15 
Writing nearly four years after the 9/11 attacks, John Arquilla, co-editor of 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy,16 describes 
the way ahead on building counterterrorism networks: 
 
If we … see ourselves as just part of a network fighting for civil society 
worldwide, good things are going to happen. And good things will keep 
happening as long as our police, military and intelligence agencies come to 
realize that their strength grows from networked information-sharing with 
each other. This is a lesson not yet learned at the top, despite the examples 
provided by real successes of networking achieved by our allies. Failure to 
learn this lesson would leave us ill prepared to defend the U.S. against 
either Al Qaeda or other networks likely to rise in the coming years, in 
emulation of Bin Laden, the dark pioneer of netwar.17 
 
Given the current outlook, until the United States begins to use effectively all its 
tools of policy both in Iraq and on the domestic front, and focuses on processes 
rather than tactical outcomes, the conclusion to be drawn is that there will be an 
endless line of al-Zarqawi, or even Bin Laden, successors and the future will 
remain uncertain. The terrorist threat will remain unabated and the lessons 
learned, or not learned, will carry over to the larger war on terror overall. 
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